This article examines the governance of social assistance in the City of São Paulo by considering the interplay between the federal normative acts that conform to the Unified System of Social Assistance (SUAS) and the decisions taken at the municipal level, in order to better understand multi-level governance in federal contexts. We demonstrate that federal-set policy parameters matter but they are not sufficient to understand how policies are implemented at the local level. Hence, the article revises some established assumptions about the local implementation of social policies in federal contexts. We argue that the governance of social assistance at the municipal level can be understood by the combination of the following aspects: 01. the power resources, capacities and constraints available for state and civil society actors; 02. the interactions and disputes between these actors in formal and informal arenas; 03. the main ideas supported by relevant actors and the instruments they use to transform ideas into policy actions. Our results show that agency at the local level matters even for nationally regulated policies. Moreover, the historical process of capacity building matters not only to state actors, but also to civil society organizations.
income benefits such as the Continuous Cash Transfer Benefit (BPC). In this article, we approach the dynamics regarding service provision. Since 2005, the policy of social assistance has been developed in the frame of a national system, known as the Unified System of Social Assistance (SUAS), which defines the responsibilities of the municipal, state and federal levels. The federal government is responsible for the general decisionmaking process, regulation, coordination, co-funding and the definition of general parameters. The municipalities oversee implementation, which occurs through the combination of service provision by the public sector and by civil society organizations (CSOs) 4 . The states are in charge of coordinating the actions developed at the municipal level, besides being responsible for the more complex levels of service provision.
Following the analytical scheme of Kazepov and Barberis (2013) 
Implementing social policy in federal contexts: multi-level governance challenges
"Where you live makes a difference, and the rescaling process that welfare regimes are undergoing increasingly constrains and enables individuals and families' agency according to the qualities of decommodified services they can have access to at the local level" (KAZEPOV, 2005, p. 24 ).
Kazepov's statement highlights the importance of analyzing the transformations in social protection systems at the local level. Following Madama (2013) , we emphasize __________________________________________________________________________________ (2017) 11 (2) e0003 -4/28 that the analysis should focus not only on policies such as pension systems or health care, but also on a relative 'marginal theme' in the comparative literature on the welfare state, which is the case of social assistance policies and their role in broader social protection systems.
At the local level, we can observe specific contentions around the provision and the regulation of policies and regarding the occupation of certain arenas by public and private actors. These disputes cannot be seen as the direct translation of national processes, even when there is a centralized decision-making process at the federal level.
Instead, the analysis of these dynamics has to focus on the combination between central regulation and local decision-making autonomy, while considering the specificities of each context (KAZEPOV and BARBERIS, 2013; SELLERS and LINDSTRÖM, 2007) .
In this article, we argue that the analysis of municipal dynamics is becoming more important to understand the governance of social assistance policies, even in a context of great centralization of decision-making power at the federal level, as argued by Arretche (2012) . In the Brazilian federation, municipalities have political and administrative autonomy. However, the implementation of national policies increasingly depends on the national government's capacity of coordinating the instruments that are available to stimulate subnational governments to follow policy guidelines (ARRETCHE, 2012; BICHIR, 2011) . Departing from the works of Rodden (2005) and Falleti (2006) , Arretche (2012) makes a significant contribution by showing that it is not possible to conceive the decentralization of policy-making as equivalent to policy decision-making autonomy. Arretche (2012) found that, contrary to 'conventional wisdom', the Brazilian federation is quite centralized, since the national level has several institutional mechanisms that reinforce its authority vis-à-vis the states and the municipalities, like exclusive legislative authority regarding numerous issues, regulatory power, capacity to control the public spending of subnational governments, etc. (ARRETCHE, 2012).
Although we agree with Arretche's main arguments (2012), it is possible to observe an analytical tension regarding the distinction between policy-making and policy decision-making, especially if we consider that implementation may be a process full of decisions. We argue that it is important to follow Gomes's (2010) suggestion to investigate the decision-making autonomy of subnational governments in a systematic way. Thus, even in the case of federal regulated policies, it is important to understand the local dynamics of governance in a historical perspective, tracing the local balance between the capacities and constraints and focusing on different types of decisions taken at the municipal level.
The examination of a densely populated (11.2 million inhabitants), rich and unequal municipality such as São Paulo has both advantages and disadvantages. Even though comparisons are limited to similar metropolises, this case allows us to test the pertinence of arguments based on state capacities (BERSH, PRAÇA and TAYLOR, 2017 5 ; BICHIR, 2011 BICHIR, , 2015 EVANS, 2011; SKOCPOL, 1985) . On the one hand, it is necessary to have different types of resources-institutional, human, and financial, as well as public policy instruments able to reach the beneficiaries-to formulate and implement social policies. On the other hand, it is also necessary to consider ideas and disputes that define the mobilization and even the creation of state capacity in specific policy arenas, to combine both constraints and agency, moving beyond common criticisms to the first generation of historical neoinstitutionalism (MADAMA, 2013; REZENDE, 2012) .
Compared to other Brazilian municipalities, São Paulo has qualified human and financial resources (BICHIR, 2011) . However, these resources are insufficient to guarantee the direct public provision of social assistance, and the dependency on CSOs to provide services is quite high. Besides the low relevance of this policy in the municipal agenda and the complexity of the vulnerable groups distributed across the territory, there are other restrictions defined at higher levels and beyond the social assistance policy governability, for example the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which sets limits to expenditures, especially regarding human resources expenses.
Regarding the social assistance policy, and specifically in the case of São Paulo,
CSOs have historically played a central role, providing assistance services long before the 'idea' of social assistance as a 'public policy'-based on 'rights', and not on charitywas defined by the 1988 Federal Constitution. In this sense, we argue that it is also important to consider the organizational capabilities available for these CSOs, mainly:
financial and human resources (including more flexible patterns of hiring than the public sector), fundraising ability, capacity to articulate with other actors and to Governance is a polysemous and controversial concept. Authors such as Lascoumes and Le Galès (2012) and Marques (2013) argue that this concept might prove useful in contexts in which the policy process involves state and non-state actors.
In this article, we adopt Marques's definition of governance: "sets of state and non-state actors interconnected by formal and informal ties operating within the policy-making process and embedded in specific institutional settings" (MARQUES, 2013, p. 31) . In our analysis, we move beyond normative perspectives and follow Lavalle and Szwako's (2015) claim that the state and civil society are 'mutually built', and thus have a relationship of co-determination.
Finally, it is important to consider the debate about regulation, which, as suggested by Kazepov (2005, p. 09) , concerns the relations between different actors, the parameters for resources allocation and other forms of structuring conflicts.
Furthermore, regulation involves commanding and controlling private provision of services and concerns the definition of parameters to structure these services (BALDWIN; CAVE and LODGE, 2012) . In regards to the social assistance policy, it is essential to understand the national regulation of this policy-the definition of macro parameters-and the creation of specific normative acts at the municipal level.
SUAS: a new paradigm with different translations
Social assistance is a very old field of interventions in Brazil, historically organized by charity organizations in a very fragmented way, lacking the regularity and the minimal parameters that characterize a public policy. The 1988 Federal Constitution is a well-established milestone in the recognition of social assistance as a public policy, Renata Bichir, Gabriela Horesh Brettas & Pamella Canato (2017) to offer specific kinds of services. The principles of co-responsibility between all levels of the federation and the co-financing of actions and services, through transfers from the National Fund for Social Assistance to the municipal and state funds, contribute to the definition of the federative structure of the system. Each municipality must organize a council and a fund of social assistance and establish a plan of action to be part of SUAS.
Public facilities 6 and private non-profit organizations provide services and benefits at the municipal level, in different mixes of public-private cooperation.
One of the main ideas supported by experts and high-level bureaucrats is the need to guarantee the construction of a public policy based on citizenship rights and on the state's responsibility for social protection (COLIN; PEREIRA and GONELLI, 2013; JACCOUD; HADJAB and CHAIBUB, 2009 ). This idea is particularly relevant to leftist governments (ALMEIDA, 2004; SÁTYRO and CUNHA, 2014 ) that advocate for a more intense participation of the state not only in the regulation of CSOs, but also in the direct provision of services. Although the national normative acts on social assistance establish co-responsibility and complementary relations between state and non-state actors, these definitions are not consensual, and there are disputes concerning the meanings of 'state responsibility', 'co-responsibility' and the role of CSOs 7 . These disputes reflect not only different ideological perspectives regarding the state's role in this policy, but also the historical process of capacity building to service delivery, which, in the case of São Paulo, is mainly concentrated in some CSOs, and not inside the public sector.
Contradicting some authors (AMÂNCIO, 2008; MARIN, 2012) , we argue that this does not mean that SUAS is not being implemented in the city.
Overcoming the legacy of past practices also means to define minimum parameters for service provision. 6 There are two main types of public facilities: 01. Social Assistance Reference Centers (CRAS) deliver basic social protection; 02. Specialized Social Assistance Reference Centers (CREAS) deliver high complex social assistance services. 7 Analyzing the interactions and disputes between state and non-state actors around the national regulation of the social assistance policy, Brettas (2016) identifies three main phases: 01. a state-centered approach after 2004, which emphasized state action both in the regulation and in the service provision; 02. after 2010, a new conception of 'SUAS private social assistance network'; 03. around 2013, the idea of 'private network' lost space to the centrality of the idea of a 'single' social assistance network of service provision, with public purpose, regardless of the nature of the organization providing the services. e0003 -9/28 academia with connections to the social assistance community (ABERS; SERAFIM and TATAGIBA, 2014) and closely linked to leftist movements and parties (GUTIERRES, 2015) and CSOs (BRETTAS, 2016) . Moreover, as we found in the city of São Paulo, connections between bureaucrats located at different levels are very important to discuss the possible translations of SUAS into concrete services, programs and regulations. During some administrations, the city conducted pioneering practices regarding service provision that later were incorporated into SUAS, in a process of policy experimentation also seen in other metropolises (GUTIERRES, 2015; MARIN, 2012) .
What does it mean to 'implement' the SUAS in very heterogeneous municipalities? Many authors recognize that translating the idea of social assistance as public policy into concrete actions is not a simple task, especially in the case of service provision. Silva et al. (2012) highlight the following explanatory dimensions: lack of municipal resources to fund the services; difficulties in the structuring and planning of the services offered in public facilities; normative acts that allow greater room for improvisation and intuitive adaptations in facilities, with different consequences; and low capacity of service delivery in public facilities, especially in the face of specific demands and vulnerabilities.
Metropolises have comparative advantages and disadvantages in the implementation of the national policy of social assistance, and many bureaucrats complain about the mismatch between the federal parameters and their realities, since most of the time the national parameters are focusing on the reality for the majority of the cities, i.e., small-scale cities, with less than 50 thousand inhabitants 8 . The most populated cities have higher institutional capacities when compared to smaller ones (BICHIR, 2011), which translates into having secretariats exclusively for social assistance, specific municipal regulation for the area, human resources that are comparatively more qualified, larger infrastructure, information systems, etc. Yazbek et al. (2012) recognize that the argument of institutional capacities does not explain this phenomenon on its own, and suggest that political decisions taken at the municipal level are central to explain these differences. They also argue that the existence of political __________________________________________________________________________________ agreements between the three levels of the bureaucracy and social assistance organizations is an important explanatory factor.
What does it mean to implement SUAS in São Paulo? The trajectory of social assistance in the city is punctuated by moments in which it becomes estranged from the federal guidelines and by moments of groundbreaking initiatives. Historically, the provision of social assistance in São Paulo was characterized by the fragmentation of actions and by the dependency on CSOs, since the involvement of the state is considered
weak both in what regards service provision and regulation (AMÂNCIO, 2008; CARDOSO, 2003; MARIN, 2012; YAZBEK, 2004) . Despite not having specific training on the subject, first ladies, i.e., mayors' wives, were traditionally in charge of this policy.
Institutional venues such as the Municipal Council for Social Assistance (COMAS) 9 and the Municipal Fund for Social Assistance (FMAS) only started to function during the leftwing administration of Marta Suplicy (2001 Suplicy ( -2004 , who was, not coincidentally, the first to appoint an expert in social assistance to lead the municipal secretariat of social assistance.
There are some explanations for the advances and setbacks in the municipal trajectory of social assistance. According to Marin (2012) , this configuration is due to: 01. the rotation between progressive administrations, which understand social assistance as a right and a public policy, and conservative administrations that associate the field with charity, focusing on discontinuous and discretionary actions;
and 02. the existence of moments of alignment with the federal level punctuated by moments of estrangement. We argue that these arguments alone do not explain the modes of governance of the social assistance municipal policy, particularly those of the Haddad administration (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) , which is politically in line with the federal administration 10 . We also consider the argument of Amâncio (2008) to be an insufficient explanation: the author contends that the municipal policy is guided by micro-decisions that are made at the local level, mainly by CSOs, more than it is guided by the state's rationality (macro-decisions). From our point of view, this is an oversimplified vision of the policy that does not give enough attention to the complexity of multi-level governance. Renata Bichir, Gabriela Horesh Brettas & Pamella Canato (2017) 11 (2) e0003 -11/28 Yazbek et al. (2012) have identified another explanatory element; the secretary's profile. The authors emphasize the importance of having secretariats that combine technical and political elements. In addition, we argue that it is crucial for the head of the secretariat to belong to or be connected with the social assistance policy community. This relational resource is important to navigate through the ideas and normative parameters, since the secretary is the first level of local transformation of the federal laws into specific municipal regulations, and to be able to pull the strings in the interaction with the CSOs, which dispute ideas and definitions inside this policy community, even at the federal level. This relational resource of the head of the secretariat also translates into a higher capacity of bargaining, which is especially important in the interactions with the CSOs; knowing the terminology, the disputes around the identity of social assistance, the legacy, and the numerous and sometimes confusing normative acts regarding this policy sector, matters.
__________________________________________________________________________________
In this article, we argue that the social assistance municipal dynamics do not Implementing SUAS in São Paulo: historical legacies and recent trends "Social assistance in São Paulo is the CSOs" 11 .
"Today the CSOs are part of social assistance. Before, they were the social assistance" 12 .
General patterns and institutional arenas
Currently, 94% of the agents supplying social assistance services in São Paulo are CSOs that have signed a partnership with the municipality 13 . Although there is an important variation across the country, the national data points to a very different scenario: on average, 68% of the social assistance units are public and only 32% are private (BRASIL, 2015) . This means that, in São Paulo, the public sector is much more enrolled in the regulation and supervision of the services offered by these private non- FAS primarily consists of beneficiaries, social assistance workers and organizations that operate in the field. Due to its trajectory and its precedents, the forum has been recognized as a 'stronghold' 14 of social assistance's interests, even during the conservative administrations prior to the implementation of SUAS (YAZBEK, 2004) .
COMAS, on the other side, is a collegiate body with deliberative, legislative and monitoring prerogatives, composed of an equal number of members from government and civil society. Tatagiba (2007) shows that COMAS is an influential actor both in the formulation and in the implementation of the social assistance policy. The registration of social assistance organizations in this council is the starting point to establish a partnership with the public sector. This council has the prerogative to approve (or not) the government's program for social assistance, which is developed by the municipal secretariat. Our interviews also reinforce the idea of COMAS as an important arena to defend the CSO's interests; 'the organizations are there and have the strongest voice' 15 .
However, not all CSOs are capable of gaining access to COMAS and making an appropriate use of it. Small CSOs often depend on the most powerful organizations to be able to participate in the council.
COMAS also plays a major role in what concerns the budget, lobbying for increases of funding in the municipal chamber (TATAGIBA, 2007). Peres 16 (2016) stresses the existence of different levels of conflict in the municipal budgetary process, whose definition is, in part, a result of the federal structure associated with the funding of SUAS. The share allocated to social assistance within the municipal budget is constrained due to federal-set mandatory expenses, such as expenses with personnel (active and inactive), as well as other incompressible expenditures, such as the federalset earmarking expenses with health and education (PERES, 2016) . Additionally, the share of social assistance in the budget reflects how important this policy area is in the mayor's agenda, as well as the interactions between the municipal chamber, the CSOs __________________________________________________________________________________ 14 Interview with a CSO's representative. 15 Interview with a representative from the public sector within COMAS. 16 We would like to thank Ursula Peres for the valuable explanations regarding the municipal budget process and for assisting us with data collection and treatment. organization. There are small organizations whose activities are restricted to a specific territory, whereas others function as if they were companies, providing different services in diverse areas of the city. The number and profile of beneficiaries also varies greatly, which affects the CSO's bargaining power with the public sector: the larger the share of demand one civil organization is responsible for, the bigger its power; this is also valid for organizations specialized in serving specific vulnerable groups. Regarding budget, the CSOs vary according to the level of their dependence on partnerships with the public sector or availability of alternative sources. Another important characteristic concerns the period in which CSOs started to participate in the municipal policy-before or after the implementation of SUAS. Those CSOs that were already participating in the policy tend to be more resistant to change; it is more difficult for them to adapt to the parameters of SUAS. Finally, it is also possible to differentiate those CSOs whose activities are mainly or exclusively in the field of social assistance, and those who develop activities in other areas. In the first case, they tend to adhere to the social assistance policy more than in the second case. These characteristics imply different relations amongst the organizations and different resources in the interaction with the public sector.
This article follows the debate around the importance of understanding the modus operandi of CSOs, an idea present in the work of Lavalle, Castello and Bichir (2007) : "the relational approach shows that-at least in the case of São Paulo-the universe of civil society organizations is hierarchical and unequal in what concerns the capacity to act and to dialogue" (LAVALLE, CASTELLO and BICHIR, 2007, p. 488) . In an analysis about the specific patterns of relationships between the social assistance organizations among themselves and with other civil society actors, Lavalle, Castello and Bichir (2008) state that these organizations are connecting peripheral organizations, such as neighborhood associations, to financial organizations, acting like mediators.
We have also found an interesting pattern of hierarchical relations and of specialization. Our interviews suggest that CSOs' actions are not fragmented, as argued by Amâncio, Serafim and Dowbor (2011) . Quite the contrary: the existence of an organized group of CSOs aiming to advocate their agendas strengthens their organizational capacities. Our results point to the existence of specific forms of articulation: large organizations tend to easily access the institutional arenas (COMAS, FAS and SMADS) and can influence the disputes, while small associations tend to gather around big organizations and help to put pressure on certain topics and support specific positions.
Big organizations, both religious and non-religious, have a central role in service supply, participate actively in COMAS and FAS, are capable of bargaining, and are less dependent on public resources, since they have other sources of funding. They can improve their employees' wages and to offer more diversified services, beyond the minimum parameters defined at national and municipal levels. In some cases, they act as if they were an extension of the municipality and they conceive their service provision as public. It is then possible to affirm that the public sector is seriously dependent on these organizations, especially upon a couple of large organizations that were frequently mentioned in our interviews, but also dependent on the small-scale ones, which have great territorial reachability and can reach specific vulnerable groups. This does not mean that the state is not trying to improve its capacity for service provision, as discussed in the next section.
State capacity in service provision: the public facilities
A central dimension to ensure the implementation of SUAS is the expansion of social assistance public facilities, and this has happened in São Paulo. Departing from the analysis of the expansion of public facilities for the provision of basic social assistance We would like to thank José Militão for the processing of data from Censo Suas, which served as a basis for the elaboration of the maps, tables and graphs used in this section. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the number of CRAS in the City of São Paulo (Table 01) sought to improve some of the previous normative acts, in a more democratic perspective. One of the priorities, regarding regulation, was the definition of a protocol for the supervision of CSOs, aiming to minimize discretionary decision s in this activity.
The members of the CSOs we have interviewed have more often mentioned the municipal normative acts than the federal ones. These mentions are frequently associated with complaints about the existence of 'too many parameters' 23 and about their rigidity, and with criticisms regarding the low values that serve as reference costs.
It is also common to hear that these normative acts leave a huge margin to interpretation in the supervision of CSOs' reports. The discretionary interpretation of the normative acts is a constant object of conflict between CSOs and the municipal secretariat, especially regarding the space for discretionary interpretations by middlelevel bureaucracy when the secretary is alien to the social assistance community. The larger CSOs are familiarized with these normative acts and regulations. As one of our interviewees said, 'knowing how to interpret the text is everything'. The secretary's profile, in right-wing or left-wing administrations, and his/her knowledge of the field might facilitate (or not) the dialogue between the public sector and the CSOs. Many of the normative acts have been developed within COMAS, where the major CSOs are highly-powerful actors in the negotiations. Our data supports Yazbek et al.'s (2012) argument about the organizations' autonomy in the city of São Paulo, despite the existence of legal constraints and minimal standards defined by the public sector to regulate CSOs' actions, they enjoy great technical and managerial autonomy.
Briefly, in the case of São Paulo, the interplay between federal and municipal normative acts is constrained by historical legacies-the resilience and expansion of CSOs' service provision-by the profile and agendas of the head of the secretariat and her/his connections with the social assistance policy community. If the federal funding seems relatively small, when considered in absolute values, it is a considerable amount, pushing for the idea of following the SUAS (otherwise, the transfer of federal resources may be interrupted). Sometimes the national parameters are very different from the city's reality. Thus, the space for local disputes over regulation is even bigger, and the
results depend on the balance of forces between the head of the secretariat and her/his staff with the CSOs in the main arenas of this policy.
Conclusions
This article sought to analyze the determinants of the implementation of the municipal policy of social assistance in São Paulo, in the light of the constraints and incentives arising from vertical relations, and in particular those defined by SUAS.
Another goal was to examine these determinants departing from the observation of horizontal governance dynamics, focusing on the relationship between state actors and CSOs involved in the provision of social assistance services. We showed that macro- In what concerns the vertical relations, São Paulo has some decision-making autonomy partly because of its institutional capacities (BICHIR, 2011; SELLERS and LINDSTROM, 2007) . However, this argument is insufficient to explain the policy dynamics. This is a municipality with high capacities (administrative and financial resources, recent expansion of public facilities) and a certain degree of autonomy. The forms of policy governance differ from what is stipulated at the national level. While one of the central principles of SUAS is the centrality of the state not only in the regulation of private organizations, but also in the direct provision of services, São Paulo is still highly dependent on the CSOs' provision. Besides, organizations also play a major role in the e0003 -23/28 definition and interpretation of normative acts. As we have shown, the key disputes at the municipal level are related to the municipal budget and the amounts payed to the CSOs, and over the definition of minimal principles regarding service provision.
Thus, political choices, constraints and local dynamics matter. At the federal level, a link between more progressive governments and agendas that favor the state provision of services has been identified, particularly when we compare Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula's administrations (ALMEIDA, 2004; SÁTYRO and CUNHA, 2014) . However, in the case of São Paulo, it is not possible to make such a direct association. The differences between Marta and Haddad's administrations (both from the Workers' Party, PT, at that time) suggest that besides the mayor's political and ideological profile, it is also important to consider the political and ideological orientation of the secretary of social assistance. In addition to the technical and political requirements, being part of the social assistance community makes a difference, especially in what concerns the relationship with CSOs; variation in the capacity of putting agendas forward, active/reactive attitude in face of the CSOs' demands, and (as)symmetry of information.
Certain arenas are essential to foster the interaction between state and nonstate actors and to the construction of the municipal policy. These disputes happen within formal institutions, such as COMAS, SMADS and the municipal chamber, but also in informal ways. There is a CSO ecology, a myriad of organizations interacting and disputing the decision-making arenas. These dynamics are influenced by different determinants that may be combined in different ways. So far, it is possible to highlight the following aspects: size of the organizations (budget, sources of resources and services capacity); time of creation or expansion (before or after SUAS implementation); origin and profile (within social movements, religious organizations or managerial profiles); and fields of action (social assistance only or also in other areas).
Departing from the data that we have analyzed so far, we can argue that the local governance of the social assistance policy is defined by the capacities (municipal budget, human resources, well-defined institutional arenas) and by the constraints (size, profile and spatial distribution of the vulnerable population, the low budget and scarce attention paid to this field) that characterize this policy. Moreover, these governance patterns are explained by the choices and the contingent results arising from the complex formal and informal interactions between state and non-state actors, which
